MonadBFT Deep Dive - A Mechanism-Design Foundation for High-Performance Consensus - Part 1
Overview
Consensus protocols live inside economies. Validators carry stake, pay operating costs, chase or defend against MEV, and sometimes collude. If we describe MonadBFT as only a message-passing algorithm, we miss the forces that drive real outcomes. In this series we treat MonadBFT as a mechanism: a rule system played by strategic agents. O...
LayerZero - The Journey of a Cross-Chain Message (V2) — “Universal Postal Service”
Overview
This is a short presentation that explains the journey of a message using LayerZero’s cross-chain messaging protocol. It’s structured like a presentation with accompanying notes.
Learning Intentions & Success Criteria
Learning Intentions
Understand how LayerZero V2 moves a message across chains—securely and reliably
Trace th...
AI-Driven Coalition-Proof Attestation for Cross-Chain Messaging Systems - Part 2
The CORE Pipeline
In Part 1 we showed why a forged cross-chain message is unprofitable when the cost of corruption (stake at risk, reputation at risk, and chance of being caught) dominates the value at risk. Part 2 turns that idea into a working system that a protocol can run on a schedule: it sets stakes, fees, and watcher bounties; it proves ...
Coalition-Proof Attestation for Cross-Chain Messaging Systems - Part 1
A practical deep dive into game theory, correlation, and mechanism design for LayerZero (split), CCIP (quorums), and Across (optimistic)
Most bridges don’t fail because the cryptography breaks—they fail because the economics make cheating profitable for a small, correlated group at the same time. If we want to reason clearly about LayerZero’s s...
Prop AMMs on Monad - A Mechanism-sound, Execution-time Router for Atomic Best-execution
Introduction
In my previous article on game-theoretic vulnerabilities in shMONAD bandwidth allocation, I showed how bandwidth staking can create a high-stakes, non-cooperative congestion game where strategic timing (e.g., flash-commit bursts) distorts access to RPC throughput. This follow-up blog on Monad looks at a different chokepoint—price d...
Application-Controlled Sequencing (ACS) as Pigouvian Policy for MEV - Internalizing Externalities at the App Layer
Overview
Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) isn’t inherently bad; the way it’s competed for is. When extractors rush, spam, and reorder to capture value, they impose costs on everyone else, worse prices for takers, adverse selection for LPs, congestion and failed transactions for bystanders, and a latency arms race that wastes real resources. A Pi...
Deep Neural-Menu Auctions - An AI-Driven Mechanism of Blockchain Fee Markets
Abstract
Blockchain transaction fee markets have long been plagued by volatile fees, rampant overpayment, and under-utilized block capacity. Legacy first-price auctions force users into a painful guessing game, while EIP-1559’s base-fee mechanism, though an improvement, introduces algorithmic oscillations and is vulnerable to miner exploits. Thi...
Game-Theoretic Vulnerabilities in Proportional Bandwidth Allocation - A Formal Analysis of FastLane’s ShMonad Protocol
Introduction
Imagine you’re running a high-frequency trading system that relies on guaranteed RPC throughput. One morning, a flash-commit bot stakes a massive amount of shMON just before the next snapshot, locks up most of the bandwidth for 10 seconds, and your trades miss the market. What happened?
shMONAD is an innovative Liquid Staking Toke...
76 post articles, 10 pages.