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Autodeleveraging, Hyperliquid, and the $653m Debate

Tarun Chitra’s ADL paper triggered a big argument around Hyperliquid’s October 10–11 event1234. Who’s right about what, and what actually needs fixing? The ADL debate around Hyperliquid’s October 10–11 event has three main characters: Hyperliquid, whose ADL is implemented in contracts and described only briefly in docs5. Tarun’s paper, w...

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Can Your AI Agent Be Forced to Drain the Wallet? The Structural Risks of AI in DeFi

When a Transformer controls a $100M DeFi vault, can it be jailbroken into draining funds? When an AI oracle publishes “anonymized” embeddings on-chain, can adversaries recover the private data? These aren’t hypothetical questions, they’re architectural constraints imposed by two recent theorems about the functional properties of deep neural netw...

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A Control-Theoretic View of Arbitrum’s Constraint Ladder Gas Pricer

The Arbitrum post proposes replacing a single, exponential “backlog” pricer with a multi-constraint version and, further, a constraint ladder that inserts intermediate time scales between long-horizon and short-horizon resource constraints1. Short-horizon constraints (keeping executors from falling behind) should prompt fast fee responses, while...

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The Bitter Lesson and the Old Philosophers

Richard Sutton’s weariness was palpable in his conversation with Dwarkesh Patel. After fifty years in AI, the lesson he delivered was a “bitter” one: intelligence built on human intuition consistently fails, while systems that learn from experience ultimately prevail. Computation and feedback win; imitation and intuition lose. Aristotle, who gr...

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Variance-Locked Fees - A Game-Theoretic Deep Dive into Monad’s Base-Fee Mechanism

Overview Monad’s base-fee controller, inspired by adaptive optimizers like RMSprop, aims for responsiveness without twitchiness by making the fee step size inversely proportional to short-horizon variance in gas usage. However, in a permissionless blockchain, block producers control the very signal, gas usage $g_k$, that drives this variance es...

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Equivocation Detection & Slashing in MonadBFT - Game Theory & Mechanism Design Analysis - PART 1

One-round confirmation (speculative finality) in MonadBFT is only honest if equivocation is economically self-defeating. If a client can act after a single QC (Quorum Certificate), then any attempt to sign two conflicting histories must be so expensive that no rational validator tries. That’s a mechanism-design statement, not just a protocol cla...

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MonadBFT Deep Dive - A Mechanism-Design Foundation for High-Performance Consensus - Part 1

Overview Consensus protocols live inside economies. Validators carry stake, pay operating costs, chase or defend against MEV, and sometimes collude. If we describe MonadBFT as only a message-passing algorithm, we miss the forces that drive real outcomes. In this series we treat MonadBFT as a mechanism: a rule system played by strategic agents. O...

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